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LEADERS ARE THE NETWORK: APPLYING THE KOTTER MODEL IN SHAPING FUTURE INFORMATION SYSTEMS, By MAJ Jay H. Anson, SG2D, Class 10-02
Although the Army must continue to develop technology to meet future challenges, we must emphasize the integration of technology into capable formations commanded by innovative leaders who are comfortable operating under conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty.
General Martin E. Dempsey, US Army TRADOC Commander, TRADOC Pam 525-3-0: Army Capstone Concept, December 21, 2009.
Adapting Information Systems for the Future Operating Environment
Lessons learned from manually tracking friendly and enemy forces during Operations Desert Storm (ODS) in Iraq and Restore Hope in Somalia, resulted in a demand for more efficient information systems on the battlefield. Maintaining situational awareness and understanding of multiple elements moving throughout the operational area and performing different tactical missions simultaneously became extremely difficult. In the years since the end of the Cold War, the military has developed and delivered significantly advanced command and control platforms based on these lessons learned and the recommendations of past leaders.
However, today's operating environment and the uncertainty and complexity of future armed conflict call for a new approach to "network-centric warfare." (TRADOC PAM 525-3-0, 2009 ). The next generation of information systems should be designed with these capabilities in mind. To accomplish this, leaders must avoid the pitfalls of poor business practices, organizational culture, and interservice rivalry that have impacted the development of past and present information systems. The Army's acquisition and funding processes have led to a vast assortment of command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. The functions and capabilities of each system are as diverse as they are limited, having been acquired in stovepipe fashion to serve a singular or specialized purpose. An organizational culture supporting an influx of technology over the past two decades has resulted in an everincreasing amount of complex technology incorporated into each new upgrade. It has also led to a serious training deficit due to time and resource constraints. Leaders and operators either lack the knowledge and proficiency to take full advantage of system capabilities or avoid using the system altogether. As this paper illustrates, significant time and resources have been wasted due to a lack of collaboration between Services and misconceptions regarding existing degrees of joint interoperability.
This type of reform requires organizational change on a grand scale. Not only must specific policies, regulations, and standard operating procedures evolve, but paradigms, attitudes, and beliefs throughout the organization, as well. This is easier said than done. Although the (Spoth, 2010) . Had the two Services collaborated on their Unmanned Aerial System programs, the DOD would have saved taxpayers over $3 billion.
Large scale change requires more than just written policies and directives that pay lip service to the desired endstate. Such an endeavor requires leadership and genuine command emphasis along with an expert and proven approach for successfully transforming an organization of the United States Army's size and scope.
The Kotter Change Model
In his book, Leading Change, Harvard Business School Professor John Kotter introduced a goal-oriented eight-step change model for transforming large organizations (Kotter, 1996) .
Central to the success of this model are quality leaders that facilitate change by breaking the status quo, inspiring and motivating people, and institutionalizing positive changes. The eight steps are:
• Establishing a Sense of Urgency future information systems development as described in the Army Capstone Concept. The author describes how leadership shortfalls created the current situation, current measures being taken by our leaders to fix the system, and considerations for the way ahead.
Establishing a Sense of Urgency in Military Leaders and Defense Industry Elite
"But the proverbial wall has been brought to our back. What might have been considered a noble or worthy endeavor in the past is now a task that can no longer be denied or postponed." Robert M. Gates (Mullen, 2010) .
The importance of harnessing and leveraging technology received increased attention following the fall of the Soviet Union and victory during ODS (Cheney, 1991) . During subsequent reviews of national security and military strategies, significant emphasis was placed on maintaining the technological edge that gave the United States such a distinct advantage in the Persian Gulf (Shalikasvilli, 1995) . Victory in future conflicts depended on winning the "information war" and therefore the "leverage attainable from… high-speed data processing"
warranted special attention (Shalikasvilli, 1997) . The DOD set out to acquire the systems that would help them meet the mandate of the CJSC and the Secretary of Defense to "harness the GIG" (Myers, 2004) . Even today, investing in the right kinds of technology at the right time continues to be a top priority for the highest levels of government (Gates, 2008) .
In the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates identified the ability to "operate effectively in cyberspace" as one of the DOD's six key missions (Gates, 2010) . Cyberspace has evolved from merely a conduit for information to revolutionizing 150th Birthday Celebration at Fort Gordon, GA, "The Army needs to be versatile and it needs to be agile. Those are two qualities that the network brings" (Casey, 2010) .
Army leaders also acknowledge that the best technology is only as effective as a leader's ability to employ it successfully. After nine years of continuous overseas contingency operations, the DOD has come to realize that technological superiority does not equate to information superiority. The new vision and strategy must be based on a better understanding of how leaders can apply technology effectively. Rather than the centralized command and control architecture existing information systems have created, the new strategy should facilitate the decentralized mission command for which the use of IT was originally intended (Nicholson, 2005) .
The resulting sense of urgency stems from a realization that the U.S. Armed Forces will soon draw down in Iraq and Afghanistan. Consequently, the nation will enter an interwar period of familiar budget cuts, social and political advocacy for avoiding future protracted wars, and closer scrutiny of required military capability (Murray, 2008) . The danger of falling back into the previous patterns of stovepipe acquisition, competing over defense budget allocations, and divisive interservice rivalries is all too real. If this occurs, any gains towards reform made over the last nine years, and paid for in blood by America's sons and daughters, will be lost.
Creating the Guiding Coalition and Obtaining Leader Buy-in
A guiding coalition for technology reform already exists. This group of top political and military officials absolutely recognizes that a significant amount of time, taxpayer dollars, and effort is wasted on military programs each year. The overwhelming evidence of leader buy-in is manifested in recent speeches, official documents, and defense budget decisions. Senior and respected leaders across the armed forces are committed to ending interservice rivalry, changing organizational culture, and reforming acquisition. Enhanced IT, bandwidth, and processing speed over the past few decades boosted the amount of information flowing freely across the current operating environment. In less than a century, the military went from field telephones to high-speed tactical internets, The first significant leap forward came in the late 1980s with the ability to network computers (Findley, 2008) . This led to a vision and strategy in the 1990s for technology-based transformation and the ability to enhance battlespace knowledge using surveillance, communications, and information systems. This in turn influenced Army doctrine, training, defense spending, and the perception of the future operating environment. Leaders believed that technology could overcome any uncertainty and that small network-centric organizations could win wars cheaply and quickly (Network, 2001) . The business practice of the time was to build capacity through the continuous acquisition of the latest technological trends rather than filling specific demands. For example, Figure 2 shows the significant increase in the number of available systems and infrastructure in the 12 years between ODS and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). During ODS, commanders traversed the vast battlefield continuously in order to gain better situational awareness and understanding. However, limited voice and data support was available at the halt (Quinn, 1996) .
Commanders executed the majority of communications via short-burst radio messages, while sending longer messages using satellite phones (McGrath, 2006) . In contrast, the tactical networks used in OIF allowed commanders to transmit and receive vast amounts of data across the globe from centralized locations (Widder, 2002) .
Although information system capacity has increased significantly in a short amount of time, human brain capacity and the cognitive abilities of the average Soldier have not (Findley, 2008) . New risks from information overload and shortfalls in systems integration result from the complexity of new technology and threaten to overwhelm Army leaders. Rather than being a combat multiplier, the additional time gained from automating previous human functions is now spent processing and analyzing data. And there is an increased risk that pertinent data will be lost in a vast sea of electrons. If the majority of information is untimely, redundant, or irrelevant, then the extra time gained is immediately wasted. Leaders will perceive the new IT as a major drawback, rather than embracing it as a combat multiplier. The right systems and training are keys to mitigating information overload and achieving optimal systems integration. 
Communicating the Change Vision -"Operate Effectively in Cyberspace"
Never has a strategic communications campaign for the transformation of information systems been conducted with such versatility and scope on so many different fronts and through so many different mediums. The DOD has launched an extensive campaign advocating improvements to the acquisition process, the relevancy of information systems, and the quality of leader development programs. The most glaring example is the renewed focus on Cyberspace, its designation as a new warfighting domain, and the creation of the U.S. Cyber Command to dominate it (Daniel, 2010) . The DOD recognizes that better fusion of intelligence and operations using communications technology allows commanders to produce action plans that are executable in real time. But to be dominant in Cyberspace requires decentralized mission command and a campaign strategy that goes beyond the generalizations found in the Army Capstone Concept and the theories introduced during professional military education. The two dominant schools of thought regarding systems integration and combating information overload must be considered. The commonality approach favors the standardization of systems as a means of eliminating as much training and operating friction as possible. Meanwhile, the procedural approach focuses on systems integration and developing methods for processing information. ." Colonel Carlisle's statement alludes to a stronger argument regarding future C4ISR programs that John Garing, DISA Director for Strategic Planning, refers to as the "efficiency imperative (Gallagher, 2009) ." The efficiency imperative highlights the importance of reducing costs and overhead for systems by moving to a shared, standard system for common services.
In the Encyclopedia of Computer Science and Technology
Although a relatively new concept, the efficiency imperative is not without merit. The recently cancelled Net-Enabled Command Capability program failed to meet the imperative of reducing costs and overhead (Gallagher, 2009) . Despite being touted as the next-generation joint command and control platform, the program was plagued by inter-Service haggling over capability requirements, shifting demands, and funding setbacks that ultimately led to its demise. (de Czege, 2010) . Units tend to overemphasize IT acquisition and commonality as the primary means to become a "network-centric" organization. By attempting to replace the human dimension of system integration with system commonality, the tendency is to ignore the relationship between the information and combat power. Regardless of the systems integration method, competent leaders proficient in processing shared information logically are absolutely critical.
Empowering Leaders to Take Action
Despite the emphasis on shared procurement set forth in Goldwater-Nichols, the Services have often gone their separate ways in pursuing new technology (Goldwater-Nichols, 1986 ). In fact, one of the duties of the CJCS is to report any "unnecessary duplication of effort among the armed forces" and "changes in technology that can be applied effectively to warfare." Although the Army pursued the latter quite diligently, preventing unnecessary duplication was largely unsuccessful. This culminated at the onset of OIF when the DOD started associating the empowerment of leaders with providing more direct access to funds and suppliers.
With the military fighting two wars simultaneously, the services were encumbered by a combination of the complex bureaucracy in place, Title 10 U.S.C. obligations to defend the nation, the two-year timeline that the process takes, and a lack of oversight to ensure joint interoperability. By the time a new program had the budget, the associated technology was either obsolete or outdated. In an effort to streamline the process, the DOD established new policies for Concept of Operations (CONOPS) funds and Operational Needs Statements (ONS).
Originally, the ONS process was a method for requesting war reserves during combat operations (Changes, 2008) . DOD reformed ONS to facilitate the quick procurement of commercial-off-theshelf solutions to equipment or capability shortfalls using the rapid acquisition system. DOD also created CONOPS funding solely for parts, supplies, and equipment that units lacked but would need during overseas contingency operations in accordance with the anticipated mission. As a result of CONOPS and ONS, commanders would forgo requesting any equipment until the unit was in the "Train-Ready" pool of the ARFORGEN cycle just prior to a deployment. Once in this window, leaders were able to make large CONOPS purchases or submit ONS for big-ticket items not otherwise authorized (F100, 2009).
Instead of mitigating the acquisition process, the DOD actually created the current surplus accumulation of information systems. In the July 26, 2010 edition of Army Times, Lieutenant General Jeffrey Sorenson, the Army CIO-G6, remarked that in the past ten years, the Army "nearly doubled the types of radios it owns, from 11 in 2000 to 20 today" .
In that same timeframe, the Army inventory of radio systems has almost tripled, from 365,000 to 919,052. There are now almost as many radios as there are Soldiers. Many of these special purchases result in non-program of record systems being fielded to units while programs-ofrecord go unused and Soldiers remain untrained. Furthermore, there is no standardization from unit to unit either in the type of systems or equipment. Instead of flooding the operating force with more and more systems, better training on the operation and integration of existing systems is needed.
Historically, systems integration issues resulted from training deficiencies (Campbell, 1995) . A Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) newsletter on Army and Air Force integration published in 2008 included the initial report on a joint effort by both the CALL and the Office for Air Force Lessons Learned (Mangus, 2008) . In 2006, the nine-member collection and analysis team focused on Army and Air Force command and control issues during overseas contingency operations. A key finding was the need for more training on the systems of record used in theater. Anchored by past experiences with information systems, leaders wrongly believed that many information systems were not compatible or too complex and therefore opted for non-program of record systems. Training and education serves to clarify and eradicate these types of cognitive biases, misleading notions, and myths surrounding communications capabilities. The belief that Army systems can not be integrated with the information systems of other Services is a fallacy requiring a paradigm shift in the minds of leaders at all levels. Finding the time and resources to effectively train on interconnectivity methods, integration of data, and system capabilities is often the greatest challenge (Vonglis, 2008) .
Generating Short Term Wins with Better Collaboration
Clear command messages mandating reform and decisive action have resulted in a number of noticeable results in a short amount of time. Improved collaboration between the Services and defense industry leaders is improving the DOD's ability to meet leader requirements. Meanwhile, cancellation of programs rife with cost and schedule overruns have made it possible to concentrate on developing existing information systems and training facilities more appropriate for developing innovative and adaptable leaders.
In an ongoing effort to improve training facilities, all major installations are establishing 
Consolidating Gains and Producing Even More Change
Nine years of continuous overseas contingency operations have contributed greatly to breaking the parochial mentality of military culture and noticeable gains in joint, interagency, and multinational interoperability (Roefels, 2009 ). Significant progress has been made towards ending interservice rivalry, changing organizational culture, reforming the acquisition process, and identifying cost-effective methods of dealing with budget constraints and limitations.
According to the 2010 QDR (Gates, 2010) and 2008 National Defense Strategy (Gates, 2008) , current strategic defense goals focus not only on achieving joint interdependence and interoperability, but also interagency and multinational sharing of IT. Decision superiority, the process of making decisions better and faster than an adversary, is essential to executing military campaigns and operations with speed and agility. Enhancing the interoperability of joint, interagency, and multinational IT through better systems integration and management will enhance current levels of cooperation and interdependence. Beyond intra-governmental cooperation, U.S. military actions are always a multinational effort. Unfortunately, poor interoperability has denied these coalitions adequate situational awareness through a multinational common operating picture (Stenbit, 2004 
Institutionalizing the New Military Culture
As the Army vision becomes reality, leaders will develop theories, techniques, and procedures that must be documented and shared with the rest of the Army. Institutionalizing these developments entails updating existing doctrine, policies, and professional education curricula. The description of the future operating environment portrayed in recently updated
doctrine along with what it will take to fight, survive, and win described in the Army Capstone Concept are only the first steps in what is still to come.
Summary and Conclusion
Technology has enabled individuals to use information faster and cheaper. As the operational environment becomes more complex, leaders at much lower levels must gain an appreciation for the operational level of conflict and how their actions fit in to the overall campaign plan…"The Big Picture." LTG Robert L. Caslen, Jr., Tactical C4 Conference Remarks, Atlanta, GA, April 22, 2010.
The Army is effectively communicating a new vision and strategy for transformation while simultaneously changing it approach to information systems. by applying the eight-step Kotter model to the Army Capstone Concept, one gains further insight into the process while generates relevant considerations for its implementation. Senior leaders are establishing a sense of urgency and empowering leaders at all levels to take action. The ongoing focus on acquisition reform and improved interoperability is already generating short term wins and the Army is looking ahead to increasing gains in joint, interagency, and multinational interdependence. Many challenges lie ahead as new information systems are incorporated into organizational culture through revised doctrine, professional development, and education. Information systems are being recognized as more than just a passing fad or luxurious commodity. Communications systems are essential to mission command and at the heart of these systems is the leader. How leaders use the systems and the information is what matters, not the technology.
Leaders apply technology and processes to make decisions based on situational understanding, comprehension, and personal abilities (Gibson, 2009) . But the procedural approach to interoperability offers only a temporary fix, whereby system commonality should remain the ultimate goal. The Army is making great progress in clearly communicating its vision and strategy with a campaign that conveys the key issues at hand, the best options available, and the courses of action required to correct shortfalls. The aim is to empower leaders at the lowest echelons to carry out that vision and strategy. The end result is the integration and synchronization of warfighting functions that facilitate Mission Command by enabling decentralized mission execution. Tomorrow's systems must support leaders who are already comfortable with uncertainty by facilitating critical and out-of-the-box thinking, independent operation, and clear communication of the commander's intent. After decades concentrating on technology, the Army is correctly focused on leadership as the key to future information systems -leaders are the network.
